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Learning and games_hi-res logo

Learning in the Presence of Strategic Behavior

Program
Learning and Games
Location

Calvin Lab Auditorium

Date
Monday, Mar. 28 – Friday, Apr. 1, 2022
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9 – 9:30 a.m.
Coffee and Check-In
9:30 – 9:35 a.m.
Opening Remarks
9:35 – 10:30 a.m.
The Limits Of Regularized Learning In Games
Panayotis Mertikopoulos (French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS)
10:30 – 11 a.m.
Break
11 a.m. – 12 p.m.
What Does It Take To Be a Good Fisherman?
Costantinos Daskalakis (MIT)
12 – 2 p.m.
Lunch
2 – 3 p.m.
Identification Analysis In Models With Set Valued Predictions
Francesca Mollinari (Cornell University)
3 – 3:30 p.m.
Break
3:30 – 4:30 p.m.
Mechanisms To Procure Information Without Verification
Grant Schoenebeck (University of Michigan)
4:30 – 5:30 p.m.
Reception
9 – 9:30 a.m.
Coffee and Check-In
9:30 – 10:30 a.m.
Forecast Hedging, Calibration, And Game Equilibria
Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
10:30 – 11 a.m.
Break
11 a.m. – 12 p.m.
Optimal No-Regret Learning in General Games via Clairvoyant MWU
Georgios Piliouras (Singapore University of Technology and Design)
12 – 2 p.m.
Lunch
2 – 3 p.m.
Predicting Cooperation Rates With A Learning Model
Drew Fudenberg (MIT)
3 – 3:30 p.m.
Break
3:30 – 4:30 p.m.
Beyond Open Loop Algorithm Design: Learning from Decision-Dependent Data
Lillian Ratliff (University of Washington)
9 – 9:30 a.m.
Coffee and Check-In
9:30 – 10:30 a.m.
Aggregating Conflicting Forecasts
Tim Roughgarden (Columbia University)
10:30 – 11 a.m.
Break
11 a.m. – 12 p.m.
Experimental Evidence of Individual Human Learning in Games
Colin F. Camerer (Caltech)
12 – 2 p.m.
Lunch
2 – 3 p.m.
In Praise of Game Dynamics
Christos Papadimitriou (Columbia University)
3 – 3:30 p.m.
Break
3:30 – 4:30 p.m.
Analysis of the Alternating Mirror Descent for Constrained Min-Max Games
Andre Wibisono (Yale University)
9 – 9:30 a.m.
Coffee and Check-In
9:30 – 10:30 a.m.
The Transfer Performance of Economic Models
Annie Liang (Northwestern University)
10:30 – 11 a.m.
Break
11 a.m. – 12 p.m.
Learning, Incentivizing Improvement, and Fairness in the Presence of Strategic Agents
Avrim Blum (Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago)
12 – 2 p.m.
Lunch
2 – 3 p.m.
The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization
Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University)
3 – 3:30 p.m.
Break
3:30 – 4:30 p.m.
How (Not) to Run a Forecasting Competition: Incentives and Efficiency
Rafael Frongillo (University of Colorado Boulder)
9 – 9:30 a.m.
Coffee and Check-In
9:30 – 10:30 a.m.
The Invisible Hand of Prediction
Moritz Hardt (Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems)
10:30 – 11 a.m.
Break
11 a.m. – 12 p.m.
Communicating with Anecdotes
Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research)
12 – 2 p.m.
Lunch
2 – 3 p.m.
Reinforcement Learning for Complex Security Games and Beyond
Fei Fang (Carnegie Mellon Univeresity)
3 – 3:30 p.m.
Break
3:30 – 4:30 p.m.
Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information
Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research)
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  • Home
  • Programs & Events
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    • Public Lectures
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    • Internal Program Activities
    • Algorithms, Society, and the Law
  • People
    • Scientific Leadership
    • Staff
    • Current Long-Term Visitors
    • Research Fellows
    • Postdoctoral Researchers
    • Scientific Advisory Board
    • Governance Board
    • Industry Advisory Council
    • Affiliated Faculty
    • Science Communicators in Residence
    • Law and Society Fellows
  • Participate
    • Apply to Participate
    • Plan Your Visit
    • Location & Directions
    • Postdoctoral Research Fellowships
    • Law and Society Fellowships
    • Science Communicator in Residence Program
    • Circles
    • Breakthroughs Workshops and Goldwasser Exploratory Workshops
  • Support
    • Annual Fund
    • Funders
    • Industrial Partnerships
  • News & Videos
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