All talks listed in Pacific Time. Schedule subject to change.

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Coffee and Check-in
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Opening Remarks
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Algorithmic Mechanism Design with Investment
Paul Milgrom (Stanford University)
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Break
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Endogenous Market Formation: Theory and Evidence from Chilean College Admissions
Soohyung Lee (Seoul National University)
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The Intractability of Hylland-Zeckhauser and its Aftermath
Thorben Tröbst (UC Irvine)
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Lunch (on your own)
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Estimating Separable Matching Models
Bernard Salanié (Columbia University)
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Market Design for Priority-Based Assignment with Distributional Objectives
Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University)
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Strict Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Hedonic Games with Friend-Oriented Preferences
Bettina Klaus (University of Lausanne)
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Break
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Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching
Andrew Tai (UC Berkeley)
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Stable Matching by Optimal Transport
Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley)
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Reception
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Coffee and Check-in
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Simple Proofs of Important Results in Market Design
Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
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Break
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Matching and Disclosure
Hector Chade (Arizona State University)
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Auto-bidding, Auctions, and Ad Allocation
Aranyak Mehta (Google)
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Lunch (on your own)
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LP-Duality and the Cores of Games
Vijay V. Vazirani (UC Irvine)
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High Dimensional Calibration for Rational Decision Making
Aaron Roth (University of Pennsylvania)
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Break
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Stability in Tranding Networks
Zsuzsanna Jankó (Corvinus University of Budapest)
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Complementarities and Externalities
Thanh Nguyen (Purdue University)