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Rational Synthesis
Orna Kupferman (Hebrew U)
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The Complexity of Computing a Tarski Fixed Point of a Monotone Function, With Applications to Games and Equilibria
Kousha Etessami (University of Edinburgh)
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Designing Agents' Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University)
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United for Change: Deliberative Coalition Formation to Change the Status Quo
Edith Elkind (University of Oxford)
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium With an Algorithmic Perspective
Jean-Francois Raskin (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium)
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Finding and Certifying (Near-)Optimal Strategies in Black-Box Extensive-Form Imperfect-Information Games
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)
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Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Fault Tolerance and Implementation with Cheap Talk
Joseph Halpern (Cornell University)
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Safe Human-Interactive Control via Shielding
Osbert Bastani (University of Pennsylvania)
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Computational Aspects of Equilibria and Fixed Points
Mihalis Yannakakis (Columbia University)
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Formal Languages and Automata for Reward Function Specification and Efficient Reinforcement Learning
Sheila McIlraith (University of Toronto)
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A Negotiation Framework for Distributed Reactive Synthesis
Kaushik Mallik (Max Planck Institute for Software Systems)
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Abstract Value Iteration for Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning
Kishor Jothimurugan (University of Pennsylvania)