Abstract
The traditional Groves mechanism assures incentive compatibility for static agents, but it does not extend to general dynamic stochastic systems. We identify an explicit class of games of broad interest for which mechanisms for incentive compatibility can be established. Motivated by energy markets, we also address the issue of ensuring budget balance and individual rationality. Joint work with Ke Ma.
Bio:
Dr. P. R. Kumar’s current focus includes Cyberphysical Systems, Security, Privacy, Autonomous Vehicles, Unmanned Air Vehicle Traffic Management, 5G, Wireless Networks, Power Systems, Control Theory, Information Theory, Stochastic Systems, Operations Research. He is a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering, The World Academy of Sciences, and the Indian National Academy of Engineering. He was awarded an honorary doctorate by ETH, Zurich. He has received the IEEE Field Award for Control Systems, the Donald Eckman Award of American Automatic Control Council, the Fred Ellersick Prize of IEEE Communications Society, the Outstanding Contribution Award of ACM SIGMOBILE, the Infocom Achievement Award, and a SIGMOBILE Test-of-Time Paper Award. He is a Fellow of IEEE and ACM Fellow. He was Leader of the Guest Chair Professor Group on Wireless Communication and Networking at Tsinghua University, is a Gandhi Distinguished Visiting Professor at IIT Bombay, and Honorary Professor at IIT Hyderabad. He was awarded the Distinguished Alumnus Award from IIT Madras, the Alumni Achievement Award from Washington University in St. Louis, and the Daniel Drucker Eminent Faculty Award from College of Engineering, University of Illinois.