Game Theory in Auction and Blockchain

Game theory has provided a mathematical framework for addressing issues in many domains, including economics and distributed computing systems. In recent years the rise of novel commercial infrastructure, such as electronic auction (for on-line ads) and blockchain, has led to many new interdisciplinary studies involving algorithmic games. In this talk we discuss some recent work from this perspective. For example, is it true that more revenue can always be extracted from an auction where the bidders are more willing to pay than otherwise? Can more revenue be extracted when the bidders are more risk-tolerant than otherwise? We also present some new results on blockchain and game theory. These results help shed light on some structural questions in economics whose answers are non-obvious.

In celebration of the 50th anniversary of computer science at UC Berkeley and the university’s sesquicentennial, EECS and the Simons Institute are launching a special series of lectures by winners of the ACM A.M. Turing Award, considered the field’s equivalent of a Nobel Prize. In addition to their technical talk, the lecturers will reflect on their time at UC Berkeley and look toward the future of research and technological development in their fields.

Light refreshments will be served before the lecture at 3:30 p.m.