# Challenges For Causal Inference On Digital Platforms

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#### Causal stories about algorithmic moderation on social platforms

Filter bubbles

Echo chambers

**Political polarization** 

Radicalization

Amplification

Misinformation

All urgent, fiercely debated problems

Limited theoretical and empirical understanding

#### Two projects about causal inference on social platforms

#### Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter (2022)

Ferenc Huszár, Sofia Ira Ktena, Conor O'Brien, Luca Belli, Andrew Schlaikjer, MH

#### Causal inference struggles with agency on online platforms (2022) Smitha Milli, Luca Belli, MH

Based on two years consulting at Twitter (2019--2021)

#### Twitter's Home timeline

What you see when you log on

Personalized algorithmic ranking since 2016

Machine learning model trained on various data

Before: Reverse-chronological ordering (and some filtering)

Intense public debate about the effects of algorithmic ranking

Especially in the political context



### Who is benefitting from the algorithmic timeline?

PEW RESEARCH CENTER | OCTOBER 15, 2020

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#### Differences in How Democrats and Republicans Behave on Twitter

A small minority of users create the vast majority of tweets from U.S. adults, and 69% of these highly prolific tweeters are Democrats

#### **False Accusation:**

The Unfounded Claim that Social Media Companies Censor Conservatives

PAUL M. BARRETT AND J. GRANT SIMS

#### Twitter's algorithm does not seem to silence conservatives

The platform's recommendation engine appears to favour inflammatory tweets

AUG 1ST 2020

→ Compared with a chronological newsfeed, Twitter's algorithm tends to show tweets that are more emotive

**Question:** Does algorithmic personalization cause an advantage along established political lines?

The

Economist

### **Experimental setup starting in 2016**

**Control group:** Randomly chosen 1% of all global users assigned reverse-chronological timeline

**Treatment group:** Randomly chosen 4% of all global users assigned new algorithmically ranked control group

Primarily used for product tweaks over the years

#### Idiosyncrasies of the experimental setup

Network effects ("violation of SUTVA")

Control group mostly sees content written by non-control users

Treatment changes over time (updates to algorithm)

Control changes over time (safety filters etc)

Twitter used experimental setup for tweaking the platform

## Hodge-podge causal effects

Randomization breaks confounding

But: All mediators at play simultaneously (hodge-podge causal effect)

- Network effects active
- How well different actors strategically respond to algorithmic timeline
- Twitter's own optimizations based on experimental setup



Different mechanisms have different political, moral, and sociological meaning.

#### Defining and measuring algorithmic amplification

**Amplification ratio** of a set *T* of tweets in a set *U* of users:

number of treatment users in U who encountered a tweet in T divided by number of control users in U who encountered a tweet in T

**Example:** *U* is all German Twitter users, *T* is all tweets by politicians of the CDU in from April 1, 2020 to August 15, 2020.

Normalize amplification ratio so that **0% is equal proportion**, i.e., random user from **U** in treatment is just as likely to see a tweet in **T** as a random user from **U** in control.



#### Scope of algorithmic audit

Millions of Tweets from individual politicians

Fine-grained analysis of the major political parties in seven countries

Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, U.K., U.S.

6.2 million news articles shared in the United States

Tweets from April through August 2020

#### Algorithmic amplification for each party



# Right versus left of the spectrum







## Discussion

- Across seven countries, right-wing parties benefit as much, and often more, from algorithmic personalization than left-wing parties
- US media outlets with a right-leaning bias are amplified marginally more
- Among individual politicians party membership is not strongly associated with amplification
- Study does not pin down mechanism(s) behind the effect
  - Growing evidence that different parties utilize Twitter differently, e.g., Parmelee, Bichard (2011), Freelon, Marwich, Kreiss (2020)
- Focus is on relative differences among parties and politicians, not the question whether we'd be better off with chronological timeline for everyone.

# Agency and control on social platforms

#### User choice and controls

A common response to concerns with algorithmic moderation: "Let's give users more control over what they see and how they see it."

Twitter offers numerous user controls, including:

- Personalized push notifications
- Personalized email notifications
- Personalized algorithmic timeline
- Quality filter

All opt-in/treatment by default, but users can opt-out

#### Understanding causal effects of user agency

Some users opting out gives us data about both treatment and control.

- 1. Can we estimate the causal effect of opt-in from observational data?
- 2. Do randomized experiments (A/B tests) anticipate the effect that opt-out has on those who choose to do so?

Positive answer to (1) would allow us to avoid costly, and possibly unethical, randomized experiments

Positive answer to (2) would allow us to anticipate effects of offering user control

### **Experimental setup: Within-study comparison**

Randomized controlled trial



Similar to setup in Gordon, Zettelmeyer, Bhargava, Chapsky (2019) study on failure of observational methods in the context of Facebook ads

## Scope of study

*Four* large-scale within-study comparison of experimental and observational causal inference on the Twitter platform

Four user settings: Push notifications, email notifications, algorithmic timeline, quality filter

Four standard observational causal methods



RCT = Randomized controlled trial DIGM = difference in group means EM = exact matching RA = regression adjustment IPTW = inverse probability of treatment weighting

### **Persistent confounding**

Adjusted for 14 available variables that could be confounding behavior "Power user" "Privacy sensitive" "Restricted account"



What drives user choice is poorly described by observable user features.

Caveat: Impossible to rule out that there could be an observational design that works.

#### Catch 22

Platforms enable user controls, because human behavior is complex and hard to predict from observable features.

This difficulty of predicting user agency makes it hard to deconfound treatment in an observational study.

Example: Propensity score Pr(Treatment | user observables) asks us to predict user agency from observable features about the user.

# Conclusions and challenges

#### **Causal effects of algorithms in social systems**

Why is it so hard to understand the causal effects of algorithms?

Methodologically, not just micro, also macro:

- RCTs surface valuable empirical understanding
- RCTs alone tell us what the dynamics are that bring macroscopic changes

Microfoundations for algorithmic decisions:

- How do individuals respond to algorithmic decisions?
- We currently lack adequate microfoundations for algorithmic decisions, cf., Mendler-Dünner, Jagadeesan, *H* (2021)

#### **Broader directions**

More theoretical/conceptual work should provide definitions that clarify hypothesized causal mechanisms

More empirical work should attempt to test and establish causal relationships

What causal questions do we want to answer?

What experiments do we want platforms to conduct?

# Thank you.