Beyond minimax optimization: Learning Dynamics in adversarial learning

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Outline

• Part 1: Beyond minimax optimization by considering implicit biaises.

The implicit biais of Adam for GANs training.

• Part 2: Beyond minimax optimization by replacing optimization by sampling.

A distributional robustness perspective for adversarial training

The implicit biais of Adam for GANs training

Joint work with Samy Jelassi, Arthur Mensch and Yuanzhi Li











Training Dynamics



- 4. Update w
- 5. Repeat

Principled optimization for minimax games

BUT Gradient descent ascent does (should) not work!

Principled minimax methods for GANs:

- Two timescale updates [Heusel et al. 2017]
- Optimistic method [Daskalakis et al. 2018]
- Hamiltonian Gradient Descent [Balduzzi et al. 2018]
- Extra-Gradient [G. et al 2019],
- Negative momentum [G. et al. 2019]
- Anchoring [Ryu et al 2019]

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An inconvenient truth

Principled methods I tried for GANs:

- Extra-Gradient [G. et al 2019],
- Negative momentum [G. et al. 2019]

These principled methods alone could not close this gap! (At least for me)







Some Facts; beyond the anecdote

- SGD is outperformed (significantly) by Adam.
- Adam is the optimizer of choice of all the latest SOTA results on GANs:



Some Facts; beyond the anecdote

- SGD is outperformed (significantly) by Adam.
- Adam is the optimizer of choice of all the latest SOTA results on GANs:

- Adam (not that principled) is added on top of principled methods:
 - Two timescale updates [Heusel et al. 2017]
 - Optimistic Adam [Daskalakis et al. 2018]
 - Extra-Adam [G. et al 2019],
 - Negative momentum with Adam [G. et al. 2019]
 - Adam with anchoring [Ryu et al 2019]

<u>Question:</u> Why does Adam do that SGD does not?

What does Adam do?

- It's an adaptive method.
- Many justifications to explain why it works well in practice:
 - Rescale "each coordinate" of the gradient. (so moves globally faster)
 - Avoid saddle points [Ovieto et al. 2021]
- But:
 - Oral presentation at Neurips 2017: [Wilson et al. 2017]
 Outperformed by SGD for image classification
 - <u>Best paper award at ICLR 2018</u> [Reddi et al. 2018] showed it **does not converge!**



$$egin{aligned} m_t &= eta_1 m_{t-1} + (1-eta_1) g_t \ v_t &= eta_2 v_{t-1} + (1-eta_2) g_t^2 \end{aligned}$$

What does Adam do?

$$heta_{t+1} = heta_t - rac{\eta}{\sqrt{\hat{v}_t} + \epsilon} \hat{m}_t.$$
Has a **direction** and a **norm** that differs from SGD

What we did

Check whether it is the **direction** or the **norm** (or both?) of the Adam update that implies superior performance



Results



- 1. AdaLR is as good as Adam (i.e. the direction does **not** matter)
- 2. The norm of the Adam direction is constant across time.

The method that worked



Should work as well as Adam!

NormSGDA vs. Adam



I-nSGDA: layer normalized SGDA g-nSGDA: normalized SGDA



Experimental Conclusion

- (In our CAN setting) normalized SCD is a proxy for Adam
- Adam is a proxy for normalized SGD!

Why is it great:

- 1. Way easier to analyze and understand normalized SGD and its implicit biaises.
- 2. Way easier to tune (significantly less hyperparameters)
- 3. Room for improvement (easier to build on top of Normalized SGD than Adam)

Analysis of Normalized SGDA vs SGDA

Linear Generator:

$$G_{\mathcal{V}}(z) = Vz = \sum_{i=1}^{m_G} v_i z_i,$$

Distribution with two modes u_1, u_2 : data-point $X = s_1u_1 + s_2u_2 \in \mathbb{R}^d$. with $\langle u_1, u_2 \rangle > 0$ and $X = u_1$ or $X = u_2$

Binary Latent random variable:
$$\Pr[z_i = 1] = \Theta\left(\frac{1}{m_G}\right), \quad \Pr[z_i = z_j = 1] = \frac{1}{m_G^2 \operatorname{polylog}(d)}$$

[Allen-Zhu & Li (2021)]: z_i can be seen at the distribution of the hidden layers of a deeper NN: they are sparse, non-negative, and non-positively correlated.

Analysis of Normalized SGDA vs SGDA

Cubic Discriminator:

$$D_{\mathcal{W}}(X) = \text{sigmoid} \left(a \sum_{i \in [m_D]} \sigma(\langle w_i, X \rangle) + \lambda b \right), \quad \sigma(z) = \begin{cases} z^3 & \text{if } |z| \le \Lambda \\ 3\Lambda^2 z - 2\Lambda^3 & \text{if } z > \Lambda \\ 3\Lambda^2 z + 2\Lambda^3 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Objective:

$$\min_{\mathcal{V}} \max_{\mathcal{W}} \quad \mathbb{E}_{X \sim \mathcal{D}}[\log(D_{\mathcal{W}}(X))] + \mathbb{E}_{z \sim \mathcal{D}_z}[\log(1 - D_{\mathcal{W}}(G_{\mathcal{V}}(z)))].$$

Our Results: SGDA

<u>Informal</u>: For any stepwise choice w.h.p. SGD suffer from **mode collapse**. (Precisely, can only learn the direction of $u_1 + u_2$).

Theorem 4.1 (SGDA suffers from mode collapse). Let T_0 , η_G , η_D and the initialization as defined in Parametrization 4.1. Let t be such that $t \leq T_0$. Run SGDA for t iterations with step-sizes η_G , η_D . Then, with probability at least 1 - o(1), for all $z \in \{0, 1\}^{m_G}$, we have:

$$G_{\mathcal{V}}^{(t)}(z) = \alpha^{(t)}(z)(u_1 + u_2) + \xi^{(t)}(z), \quad \text{where } \alpha^{(t)}(z) \in \mathbb{R} \text{ and } \xi^{(t)}(z) \in \mathbb{R}^d,$$

such that for all $\ell \in [2]$, $|\langle \xi^{(t)}(z), u_{\ell} \rangle| = o(1) ||\xi^{(t)}(z)||_2$ for every $z \in \{0, 1\}^{m_G}$.

In the specific case where $\eta_G = \frac{\sqrt{d\eta_D}}{\operatorname{polylog}(d)}$, the model mode collapses i.e. $\|\xi^{(T_0)}(z)\|_2 = o(\alpha^{(T_0)}(z))$.

Illustration: SGDA mode collapse (learn the average)



Our Results: normalized SGDA

Informal: For a correct choice of step-size nSGDA learns the direction of both modes.

Theorem 4.2 (nSGDA recovers modes separately). Let T_1 , η_G , η_D and the initialization as defined in Parametrization 4.1. Run nSGDA for T_1 iterations with step-sizes η_G , η_D . Then, the generator learns both modes u_1, u_2 i.e.,

$$\Pr_{z \sim \mathcal{D}_z} \left(\left\| \frac{G_{\mathcal{V}}^{(T_1)}(z)}{\|G_{\mathcal{V}}^{(T_1)}(z)\|_2} - u_\ell \right\|_2 = o(1) \right) = \tilde{\Omega}(1), \quad for \quad \ell = 1, 2.$$
(10)

Remarks:

1. For specific initialization and choice of Generator/Discriminator.

2. Result only about learned **directions** (not the norm).

3. No guarantees that nSGD learns the correct weighting for $X = s_1u_1 + s_2u_2$.

Illustration normalized SGD learns both modes:



Conclusion (Part 1)

- GANs has some very bad (approximate) stationary points/local equilibrium.
- Normalized gradients seems to be key for training GANs.
- Converge guarantees are not enough!
- The **implicit biases** of each learning algorithms is significant!
- Need **fined-grained understanding of the dynamics** (depends on the game.)
- General nonconvex-nonconcave minimax optimization too general.

Next Question:

- 1. Importance of the minibatch-size (not too large mini batches seems critical)
- 2. Can we extend this to more complex generators and discriminators?
- 3. Does this idea extend to other setting? Multi-Agent RL?

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A distributional robustness perspective for adversarial training

A distributional robustness perspective for adversarial training

Joint work with David Dobre, Chiara Regniez, and Hugo Berard







Adversarial examples

"Machine Learning can make pigs fly" [Mądry and Kolter, 2018]





Image Source: https://gradientscience.org/intro_adversarial/

Training robust models

<u>Goal:</u> Robust classifier i.e. **not** having flying pigs.

<u>Idea:</u> Train your model against adversarial examples



Distributional robustness perspective

$$\min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^{d}} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim p_{data}} [\max_{\|\tilde{x}-x\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon} \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y))] = \min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^{d}} \max_{p_{adv} \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{x} \sim p_{adv}} [\ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y))]$$
???

Distributional robustness perspective:

- [Delage and Ye, 2010] [Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 1998]

Connection with Adversarial examples:

- [Gao et al., 2017] [Sinha et al., 2018]

Novelty here:

- Distributional robustness formulation of adversarial training (i.e. the right \mathscr{P})
- Connection with optimal transport and $\infty \infty$ Wasserstein Ball constraint.

Distributional robustness perspective

$$\min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim p_{data}} \left[\max_{\|\tilde{x}-x\|_{\infty} \le \epsilon} \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y)) \right] = \min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \max_{p_{adv} \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{x} \sim p_{adv}} \left[\ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y)) \right]$$

Definition 3.1 (Transport plan). Let p_{adv} and p_{data} be two distributions on \mathcal{X} . $\pi \in \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{X}) \otimes \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{X}) \rightarrow [0,1]$ is a transport plan between p_{adv} and p_{data} if: $\forall A \in \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{X}), \ \pi(A \times \mathcal{X}) = p_{data}(A) \quad and \quad \forall B \in \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{X}), \ \pi(\mathcal{X} \times B) = p_{adv}(B)$ (7) The mass of transport plan between p_{adv} and p_{adv} is denoted $\Pi(p_{adv}, p_{adv})$

The space of transport plan between p_{data} and p_{adv} is denoted $\Pi(p_{data}, p_{adv})$.

We want to transport *x* to \tilde{x} with the proximity constraint:

$$\mathcal{P} = \{ p_{adv} \ : \ \exists \pi \in \Pi(p_{data} | p_{adv}) \ \textit{ with } \ \operatorname{supp}(\pi) \subset \{ (x, y, \tilde{x}, y) \ \mid \|\tilde{x} - x\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon, \ y \in \mathcal{Y} \ \} \}$$

Distributional robustness perspective

$$\min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim p_{data}} \left[\max_{\|\tilde{x}-x\|_{\infty} \le \epsilon} \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y)) \right] = \min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \max_{p_{adv} \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{x} \sim p_{adv}} \left[\ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y)) \right]$$

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$$\underline{p-\infty-\text{Wasserstein distance:}} \quad W_{p,\infty}(\mu,\nu) = \inf_{\pi \in \Pi(\mu,\nu)} \sup_{(z,\tilde{z}) \in \text{supp}(\pi)} \|z - \tilde{z}\|_p$$
$$\min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim p_{data}} [\max_{\|\tilde{x}-x\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon} \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y))] = \min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \max_{p_{adv} \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(p_{data})} \mathbb{E}_{(\tilde{x},y) \sim p_{adv}} [\ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y))]$$
$$(\infty - \infty - \text{Wasserstein Ball})$$

Distributional robustness perspective



$$\min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim p_{data}} [\max_{\|\tilde{x}-x\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon} \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y))] = \min_{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d} \max_{p_{adv} \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(p_{data})} \mathbb{E}_{(\tilde{x},y) \sim p_{adv}} [\ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x},y))]$$

$$\boxed{\infty - \infty - \text{Wasserstein Ball}}$$

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Novelty here:

- Distributional robustness formulation of adversarial training (i.e. equality above)
- Connection with the $\infty \infty$ Wasserstein Ball constraint.
- Connection with optimal transport.

Insight from optimal transport

- We need to (entropy) **regularize** the transport plan between p_{data} and p_{adv} .
- By using duality we have a **closed form** for the optimal p_{adv}^* (depends on θ):

$$p_{adv}^{*}(\tilde{x}, y) = \mathbb{E}_{x \sim p_{x, data}} \left[p_{data}(y|x) \underbrace{\frac{\exp(\lambda \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x}), y)) \mathbf{1}_{\|x - \tilde{x}\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon}}{\int_{\tilde{x} \in \mathcal{B}_{\epsilon}(x)} \exp(\lambda \ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x}), y))}} \right]$$

Not easy to compute this integral

- Can **simulate** p_{adv} using Langevin Monte Carlo sampling.
- Inner problem of adversarial training: optimization \rightarrow sampling

Practical implementation

Algorithm 1 Adversarial Transport with Langevin

- 1: **input:** dataset $(x_i, y_i)_{i=1}^n$, step-size: η , number of adversarial examples: K, noise variance σ .
- 2: Initialization: $\tilde{x}_{i,k} = x_i, i \in [n], k \in [K]$
- 3: for n: nb of steps do
- 4: Sample a minibatch: $(x_i, y_i)_{i \in B}, B \subset [n]$
- 5: Load the attacks: $\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(0)} \leftarrow \tilde{x}_{i,k}, i \in B, k \in [K]$
- 6: for T : nb langevin iter do
- 7: **for** $i \in B, k \in [K]$ **do** 8: $\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)} \leftarrow \tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t)} + \eta \operatorname{sign}(\nabla_x \ell(f_\theta(\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)}, y_i)))$
- 9: $\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)} \leftarrow P_{\mathcal{B}_i(\epsilon)}[\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)} + \sigma\xi]$
- 10: $\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)} \leftarrow P_{\mathcal{X}}[\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)}]$

11:
$$\nabla_{\theta}g = \frac{1}{|B|K} \sum_{i \in B, k \in [K]} \nabla_{\theta}\ell(f_{\theta}(\tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(t+1)}, y_i))$$
12:
$$\theta \leftarrow \theta - \eta \nabla_{\theta}g$$

13: Save the attacks:
$$\tilde{x}_{i,k} \leftarrow \tilde{x}_{i,k}^{(T)}, i \in B, k \in [K]$$

14: **Return:** θ

Key insight: the adversarial dataset is a continuous function of θ (because of the regularization). **Only need one inner step of Langevin**

maintain an adversarial dataset!

Update the adversarial dataset (depends on θ) via Langevin

Update the model (to be more robust)

Results: MNIST







Conclusion (part 2)

- Distributional robustness perspective on Adversarial Training
- Closed form for the (regularized) optimal adversarial distribution.
- Replace inner optimization by sampling
- By maintaining an adversarial dataset \rightarrow warm start the sampling.
- No inner problem anymore (can alternate step of Langevin and step of SGD)
- Huge speed-up
- Caveat 1: need to keep an adversarial dataset in memory.
- Caveat 2: hard to deal with dataset augmentation.

Thanks, Questions?