

# Learning the Privacy-Utility Trade-off with Bayesian Optimization

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Joint work with B. Avent, J. Gonzalez, T. Diethe and A. Paleyes


**Utility**

**Privacy**



# Theory vs Practice

$$O\left(\frac{\sqrt{d \log(1/\delta)}}{n\epsilon}\right)$$



Plot from J. M. Abowd “Disclosure Avoidance for Block Level Data and Protection of Confidentiality in Public Tabulations”  
(CSAC Meeting, December 2018)

# Example: DP-SGD

**Input:** dataset  $z = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$

**Hyperparameters:** learning rate  $\eta$ , mini-batch size  $m$ , number of epochs  $T$ , noise variance  $\sigma^2$ , clipping norm  $L$

Initialize  $w \leftarrow 0$

**for**  $t \in [T]$  **do**

**for**  $k \in [n/m]$  **do**

        Sample  $S \subset [n]$  with  $|S| = m$  uniformly at random

        Let  $g \leftarrow \frac{1}{m} \sum_{j \in S} \text{clip}_L(\nabla \ell(z_j, w)) + \frac{2L}{m} \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I)$

        Update  $w \leftarrow w - \eta g$


**return**  $w$

- 5+ hyper-parameters affecting both privacy and utility
- For convex problems can be set to achieve near-optimal rates
- For deep learning applications we don't have (good) utility bounds

# Privacy-Utility Pareto Front

## Desiderata

1. Efficient to compute
2. Use empirical utility measurements
3. Enable fine-grained comparisons



# Problem Formulation

Parametrized Algorithm Class

$$\mathcal{A} = \{A_\lambda : Z \rightarrow W \mid \lambda \in \Lambda\}$$

Eg. DP-SGD

Error (Utility) Oracle

$$E : \Lambda \rightarrow [0, 1]$$


Eg. Expected classification error

Privacy Oracle


$$P : \Lambda \rightarrow [0, \infty)$$

Eg. Epsilon for fixed delta


# Pareto-Optimal Points




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
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
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
Hyper-parameter Space




Error

Privacy Loss

# Pareto-Optimal Points




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
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
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
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
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# Pareto-Optimal Points



Hyper-parameter Space



# Bayesian Optimization (BO)

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Input:  $F : \Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^p \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

Goal:  $\lambda^* = \underset{\lambda \in \Lambda}{\operatorname{argmin}} F(\lambda)$

Expensive,  
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
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Bayesian Optimization Loop:


Given  $k$  evaluations  $(\lambda_1, F(\lambda_1)), \dots, (\lambda_k, F(\lambda_k))$

1. Build a surrogate model for  $F$  (eg. Gaussian process)
2. Find most promising next evaluation


# BO: 1-Dimensional Example




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
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
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
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
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
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# The DPareto Algorithm

- Find privacy-utility Pareto front using *multi-objective* Bayesian optimization
- Use transformed Gaussian processes to model privacy and error oracles
- Acquisition function optimizes *hyper-volume based probability of improvement* [Couckuyt et al. 2014]

**Input:** hyperparameter set  $\Lambda$ , privacy oracle  $P$ , error oracle  $E$ , anti-ideal point  $v^\dagger$ , number of initial points  $k_0$ , number of iterations  $k$ , prior GP

Initialize dataset  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \emptyset$

**for**  $i \in [k_0]$  **do**

    Sample random point  $\lambda \in \Lambda$

    Evaluate oracles  $v \leftarrow (P(\lambda), E(\lambda))$

    Augment dataset  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \cup \{(\lambda, v)\}$

**for**  $i \in [k]$  **do**

    Fit a GP to the transformed privacy using  $\mathcal{D}$

    Fit a GP to the transformed utility using  $\mathcal{D}$

    Optimize the HVPOI acquisition function in Eq. (2) using anti-ideal point  $v^\dagger$  and obtain a new query point  $\lambda$

    Evaluate oracles  $v \leftarrow (P(\lambda), E(\lambda))$

    Augment dataset  $\mathcal{D} \leftarrow \mathcal{D} \cup \{(\lambda, v)\}$

**return** Pareto front  $\mathcal{PF}(\{v \mid (\lambda, v) \in \mathcal{D}\})$

# Example: Sparse Vector Technique

**Input:** dataset  $z$ , queries  $q_1, \dots, q_m$

**Hyperparameters:** noise  $b$ , bound  $C$

$c \leftarrow 0, w \leftarrow (0, \dots, 0) \in \{0, 1\}^m$

$b_1 \leftarrow b/(1 + (2C)^{1/3}), b_2 \leftarrow b - b_1, \rho \leftarrow \text{Lap}(b_1)$

**for**  $i \in [m]$  **do**

$\nu \leftarrow \text{Lap}(b_2)$

**if**  $q_i(z) + \nu \geq \frac{1}{2} + \rho$  **then**

$w_i \leftarrow 1, c \leftarrow c + 1$





**if**  $c \geq C$  **then return**  $w$

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

[Lyu et al. 2017]

## Setup

- 100 queries with 0/1 output, sensitivity 1
- 10% queries return 1 (randomly selected)
- Privacy: SVT analysis
- Error: 1 - F-score (avg. over 50 runs)



# Example: Sparse Vector Technique



# Implementing the Oracles

## Privacy Oracle

- Epsilon for fixed delta / Others DP variants / Attacks success metrics
- Closed-form expression / Numerical calculation (eg. moments accountant)

## Error Oracle

- Fixed input / Distribution over inputs / Worst-case (over a set of) inputs
- On expectation / With high probability
- Exact expression / Empirical evaluation

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

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


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# Machine Learning Experiments

- Adult dataset ( $n=40K$ ,  $d=123$ )
  - Logistic regression (SGD and ADAM)
  - Linear SVM (SGD)
- MNIST dataset ( $n=60K$ ,  $d=784$ )
  - MLP1 (1000 hidden)
  - MLP2 (128-64 hidden)



# DPareto vs Random Sampling



# Conclusion

- Empirical privacy-utility trade-off evaluation enables application-specific decisions
- Bayesian optimization provides computationally efficient method to recover the Pareto front (esp. with large number of hyper-parameters)

## Future work:

- Address leakage in Pareto front (when error oracle is input-specific)
- Include further criteria (eg. running time of parametrized algorithm)