

#### Differential Privacy in the Streaming World

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#### + The Streaming Model

1, 4, 5, 19, 145, 14 , 5, 5, 16, 4

+, -, +, -, +, +, -, +, -, +

### Underlying frequency vector A = A [1], ..., A[n] start with A[i] = 0 for all i.

• We observe an <u>online sequence of updates:</u>

Increments only (cash register):

- Update is  $i_t \rightarrow A[i_t] := A[i_t] + 1$
- Fully dynamic (turnstile):

• Update is  $(i_t, \pm 1) \rightarrow A[i_t] := A[i_t] \pm 1$ 

#### Requirements: compute statistics on A

- Online, O(1) passes over the updates
- Sublinear space, polylog(n,m)



#### + Typical Problems

- Frequency moments:  $F_k = |A[1]|^k + \dots + |A[n]|^k$ 
  - related: L<sub>p</sub> norms
- Distinct elements:  $F_0 = \#\{i: A[i] \neq 0\}$
- k-Heavy Hitters: output all *i* such that  $A[i] \ge F_1/k$
- Median: smallest *i* such that  $A[1] + ... + A[i] \ge F_1/2$ 
  - Generalize to Quantiles
- Different models:
  - Graph problems: a stream of edges, increments or dynamic
    - matchings, connectivity, triangle count
  - Geometric problems: a stream of points
    - various clustering problems

# • When do we need this?

- The universe size *n* is *huge*.
- Fast arriving stream of updates:
  - IP traffic monitoring
  - Web searches, tweets
- Large unstructured data, external storage:
  - multiple passes make sense
- Streaming algorithms can provide a *first rough approximation* 
  - decide whether and when to analyze more
  - fine tune a more expensive solution
- Or they can be the *only feasible solution*





Small space & differential privacy

Privacy under continual observation

# A taste: the AMS sketch for $F_2$ [Alon Matias Szegedy 96]



*h*:[n]  $\rightarrow$  {± 1} is 4-wise independent  $E[X^2] = F_2$   $E[X^4]^{1/2} \le O(F_2)$ 

#### + The Median of Averages Trick



Average: reduces variance by  $\alpha^2$ .

Median: reduces probability of large error to  $\,\delta\,$  .





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# Defining Privacy for Streams

- We will use *differential privacy*.
- The database is represented by a stream
  - online stream of transactions
  - offline large unstructured database
- Need to define *neighboring inputs:* 
  - Event level privacy: differ in a single update

1, 4, 5, 19, 145, 14, 5, 5, 16, 4

1, 1, 5, 19, 145, 14, 5, 5, 16, 4

#### <u>User level privacy</u>: replace some updates to *i* with updates to *j*

1, 4, 5, 19, 145, 14, 5, 5, 16, 4

1, 4, 3, 19, 145, 14, 3, 5, 16, 4

• We also allow the changed updates to be placed somewhere else





- Large unstructured database of transactions
- Estimate how many distinct users initiated transactions?
  - i.e. *F*<sub>0</sub> estimation
- Can we satisfy <u>both</u> the streaming and privacy constraints?
  - $F_0$  has sensitivity 1 (under user privacy)
  - Computing  $F_0$  exactly takes  $\Omega(n)$  space
  - Classic sketches from streaming may have large sensitivity

#### + Oblivious Sketch

- Flajolet and Martin [FM 85] show a sketch f(S)
  - O(log n) bits of storage
  - $F_0/2 \le f(S) \le 2F_0$  with constant probability
- Obliviousness: distribution of f(S) is *entirely* determined by  $F_0$ 
  - similar to <u>functional privacy</u> [Feigenbaum Ishai Malkin Nissim Strauss Wright 01]
- Why it helps:
  - Pick noise  $\eta$  from discretized Lap(1/ $\varepsilon$ )
  - Create new stream S' to feed to f:
    - If  $\eta < 0$ , ignore first  $\eta$  distinct elements
    - If  $\eta > 0$ , insert elements  $n+1, ..., n+\eta$
- Distribution of f(S') is a function of  $max{F_0 + \eta, 0}$ :  $\varepsilon$  -DP (user)
- Error:  $F_0/2 O(1/\varepsilon) \le f(S) \le 2F_0 + O(1/\varepsilon)$
- Space:  $O(1/\varepsilon + \log n)$ 
  - can make log n w.h.p. by first inserting  $O(1/\varepsilon)$  elements



- When can a streaming estimate of a low-sensitivity function be computed privately, in small space?
  - does privacy & small space ever require more error than either?
- Can we go beyond low-sensitivity, and local sensitivity?
  - $F_2$  has high sensitivity and high local sensitivity
  - Lipschitz extensions [Kasiviswanathan Nissim Raskhodnikova Smith 13] relevant?
- What can we say about graph problems, clustering problems?
  - Private coresets [Feldman Fiat Kaplan Nissim 09]





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## Continual Observation

■ In an online stream, often need to *track* the value of a statistic.

- number of reported instances of a viral infection
- sales over time
- number of likes on Facebook
- Privacy under continual observation [Dwork Naor Pitassi Rothblum 10]:
  - At each time step the algorithm outputs the value of the statistic
  - The entire sequence of outputs is  $\varepsilon$  -DP (usually event level)
- Results:
  - A single counter (number of 1's in a bit stream) [DNPR10]
  - Time-decayed counters [Bolot Fawaz Muthukrishnan Nikolov Taft 13]
  - Online learning [DNPR10] [Jain Kothari Thakurta 12] [Smith Thakurka 13]
  - Generic transformation for monotone algorithms [DNPR10]



![](_page_15_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Picture_0.jpeg)

- What is the optimal error possible for the counter problem?
- Privacy under continual observation for statistics that are not easily decomposable?
- User level?
- Expect privacy under continual observation to be ever more relevant
  - We usually want to *track* our statistics over time
  - Work on it!

![](_page_17_Picture_0.jpeg)

![](_page_17_Picture_1.jpeg)

Small space & differential privacy

Privacy under continual observation

![](_page_18_Picture_0.jpeg)

![](_page_18_Picture_1.jpeg)

- What if data is requests by subpoena, leaked after a security breach, an unauthorized employee looks at it?
- Can we guarantee that *intermediate states* are also private?
  - Makes sense for online data: not stored
- Pan-privacy [Dwork Naor Pitassi Rothblum Yekhanin 10]:
  - For each t: the state of the algorithm after processing the t-th update and the final output are jointly ε -DP
  - Can be event level or user level
- Strategy: keep private statistics on top of sketches

# Warm-up: $F_0$ [DNPRY10]

- Solution: <u>randomized response</u>
- Two distributions:  $D_0$  and  $D_1$  on  $\{-1,1\}$ 
  - $D_0$  is 1 w.p. 1/2;
  - $D_1$  is 1 w.p. (1 +  $\epsilon$ )/2
- Store a big table X[1], ..., X[n]
  - Initialize all X[i] from D<sub>0</sub>
- When update  $i_t$  arrives, pick  $X[i_t]$  from  $D_1$
- Can compute  $O(n^{1/2} / \varepsilon)$  additive approximation
  - $X = (X[1] + \dots + X[n]) / \varepsilon$
  - $E[X] = F_0$  and  $E[X^2] = n/\varepsilon^2$

# **Cropped** *F*<sub>1</sub> [Mir Muthukrishnan Nikolov Wright 11]

- Cropped moments:
  - $F_k(\tau) = |\min\{A[1], \tau\}|^k + |\min\{A[2], \tau\}|^k + ... + |\min\{A[n], \tau\}|^k$

 $C_i A[i]$ 

τ1

A[i]

 $2\tau$ 

• We'll be interested in  $F_1(\tau)$ 

• Can pan-privately compute X s.t.  $F_1(\tau)/2 - O(\tau n^{1/2}/\varepsilon) \le X \le F_1(\tau) + O(\tau n^{1/2}/\varepsilon)$ 

- Idea: keep each  $A[i] \mod \tau$ , with initial noise
  - What if  $A[i] = \tau + 1$ ?
  - Multiply each A[i] by a random c<sub>i</sub> uniform in [1, 2]
  - Small A[i] ( $\leq \tau / 2$ ) get distorted by at most factor 2
  - For large A[i],  $c_i$  A[i] mod  $\tau$  is large on average

**Range is**  $\tau$ , so noise O( $\tau / \varepsilon$ ) per modular counter suffices

#### + Heavy Hitters [DNPRY10][MMNW11]

![](_page_21_Picture_1.jpeg)

- Recall, the k-Heavy Hitters (k-HH) are i s.t.  $A[i] \ge F_1/k$ 
  - at most k of them
- Approximate the number of k-HH
  - notation:  $H_k$
  - a measure of how skewed the data is
- Will get pan-private estimator *X* s.t.:

 $H_k/2 - O(k^{1/2}) \le X \le H_{k \log k} + O(k^{1/2})$ 

## *k*-HH and Cropped $F_1$

• Say we want to compute an estimate X in  $[H_k, H_{ck}]$ 

Consider:

$$(F_1(F_1/k) - F_1(F_1/ck))/(F_1/k - F_1/ck)$$

- k-Heavy Hitters contribute 1
- *ck*-Heavy Hitters contribute between 0 and 1
- Anything else contributes 0
- Error of  $O(F_1 n^{1/2}/k \varepsilon)$  for  $F_1(F_1/k)$  is too much!
  - Sketch to reduce the universe size n

![](_page_22_Figure_9.jpeg)

### Idea: Use a (CM-type) Sketch

Hash [n] into [O(k)] (with a pairwise-independent hash)

![](_page_23_Figure_2.jpeg)

• Compute the number of heavy buckets (weight  $\geq F_1/k$ )

- at least  $H_k/2$  (balls and bins)
- no bucket containing items of weight  $\leq F_1/(k * \log k)$  is heavy

Essentially keeping private statistics on a CM sketch

### Lower bounds and Open Problems

- The  $O(n^{1/2})$  additive error for  $F_0$  is optimal
  - also  $O(k^{1/2})$  for  $H_k$ , by reduction
- Idea: combine streaming-style LBs with reconstruction attacks [MMNW11]
  - stop the algorithm at some time step and grab the private state
  - different continuations of the stream: answer many counting queries from the same state
  - invoke [Dinur Nissim 03] type attacks
- Lower bounds against many passes via connections to randomness extraction [McGregor Mironov Pitassi Reingold Talwar Vadhan 10]
- Do all problems of low streaming complexity admit accurate pan-private algorithm
  - intuitively: less state  $\rightarrow$  easier to make private

![](_page_25_Picture_0.jpeg)

- Private analysis of massive online data presents new challenges
  - small space
  - continuous monitoring
- Data is not stored: can ask for algorithms private inside and out
- Tools from small-space streaming algorithms can be useful
  - but we need to view them from a new angle