

Pseudorandom Obfuscation

And Applications

Based on joint work with Pedro Branco, Abhishek Jain, Giulio Malavolta, Surya Mathialagan, Spencer Peters, Vinod Vaikuntanathan

Simons Obfuscation Workshop 2025

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


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Indistinguishability Obfuscation


[BGI+01,GGH+13]

$$(x + y)(x - y)$$



$\equiv$

$$x^2 - y^2$$



$\approx$

- Currently only candidates from standard assumptions follows the **[JLS20]** mould
- Critically relies on pairings for compactness (structure!)
- **[BDGM20]** paradigm: Only heuristic instantiations

iO: Swiss Army knife of Cryptography

(subexponential) iO is “crypto complete”

- iO + OWF
 - All the standard Stuff and more
 - PKE, Short Sigs, Perfect NIZKs (non-adaptive SNARGs), OT, Deniable Enc **[SW'14]**
 - FHE **[CLTV'15]**
 - WE **[GGHRSW'14]**
 - ...
- iO + SSB
 - More advanced stuff
 - adaptive BE **[Zha'14]**
 - Succinct Garbling **[KLW'15]**
 - ...

Or is it?

Limits of iO/VBB

- Doubly Efficient Private Information Retrieval
 - Constructions from Ring-LWE [**LMW'23**]
 - Black-box Separated from VBB [**LMW'25**]
- iO/VBB seems to hit a wall even with (seemingly) simpler tasks:
 - Pseudorandom Codes [**GGW'25, DMS'25**]
 - PKE with pseudorandom keys and ciphertexts ←

Pseudorandom Encryption

iO and pseudorandomness

	key		ciphertext	
SKE	K	uniform ✓	$r, PRF_K(r) \oplus m$	pseudorandom ✓
ElGamal	g, h	uniform ✓	$g^r, h^r \cdot m$	pseudorandom under DDH ✓
[SW'14]	$iO((r, m) \mapsto PRG(r), PRF_K(PRG(r)) \oplus m)$		$PRG(r), PRF_K(PRG(r)) \oplus m$	
	not pseudorandom ✗		pseudorandom ✓	

Even if F computes unstructured function, $\text{Obf}(F)$ has structure

Compressing pseudorandom objects

- Pseudorandom keys and ciphertext $\rightsquigarrow$ Equivocality (e.g. non-committing Enc)
- iO-based schemes: Structure needs to go somewhere (e.g. into CRS [**CPR17**])
- Does obfuscation need to expose discernible structure?
- Or can it be pseudorandom?
- Advanced encryption schemes from **evasive LWE**
[**Wee'22, Tsabary'22, VWW'22**] seemingly achieving this feat
- **Are there (achievable) notions of obfuscation which are not at odds with pseudorandomness?**

Rest of the Talk

- Pseudorandom Obfuscation
- Applications
 - FHE
 - Succinct Garbling
 - Succinct WE
- Counterexample & Alternative Notions
- Construction from evasive LWE via BDGM blueprint
- Natural Counterexamples against evasive LWE

Pseudorandom Obfuscation

Pseudorandom Obfuscation

- Can obfuscation $Obf(C)$ be unstructured?
- Can $Obf(C)$ be pseudorandom?
- $Obf(C)$ exposes $TT(C)$
 - **Minimum requirement:** C computes pseudorandom function!
 - Need to consider distributions of circuits
- How does one evaluate a random program?
- Need to fix “machine model” which interprets arbitrary strings as programs
 - $\rightarrow$ some form of universal circuit

Pseudorandom Obfuscation

Strongest Notion: Double Pseudorandomness


Precondition

$TT(C)$

$\approx$

U

given $\text{aux}(C)$



Postcondition

$PRO(C)$

$\approx$

u


given $\text{aux}(C)$

xPRO: $|PRO(C)| = |TT(C)|^{1-\epsilon}$

Applications


Fully Homomorphic Encryption a la [CLTV'15]

- Levelled FHE: pk contains key chain
- Assume FHE with pseudorandom ciphertexts
- Long key chain: $N = 2^\lambda$
- Compute decryption keys locally




Succinct Garbling

- TM/RAM Computation via Step Circuits
- Oblivious memory access pattern




Succinct Garbling


- Garble step circuits
- Last GC outputs a share of the result
- Other share given in plain
- [BLSV'18]: Point&Permute GC are pseudorandom (“Blind GC”)
- Produce GCs via circuit factory



Succinct Garbling



Succinct Garbling



Pseudorandom Witness Encryption

[GGHRSW'13] recipe

- Fix NP-language $\mathcal{L}$

$C[m,x,K](w)$: Output

m if $Verify_{\mathcal{L}}(x, w) = 1$

$PRF_K(w)$ otherwise

$$\text{prWE.Enc}(x,m) = \text{PRO}(C[m,x,K])$$


$$\text{prWE.Dec}(c,w) = c(w)$$

- If $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ then $C[m, x, K](\cdot) \equiv PRF_K(\cdot)$
- By PRO-security $\text{prWE.Enc}(x,m)$ is pseudorandom if $x \notin \mathcal{L}$

Succinct Pseudorandom Witness Encryption

Compress further via PRO

- $|WE(x, m)| = \text{poly}(|C[x, K]|) = \text{poly}(|w|)$
- However, if $x \notin \mathcal{L}$, $WE(x, m)$ is pseudorandom
- Hence $F'_{x, m}(i) = (\text{prWE} \cdot \text{Enc}(x, m))_i$ is a pseudorandom function with domain-size $\log(|w|)$
- Hence define $\text{prWE}' \cdot \text{Enc}(x, m) = \text{PRO}(F'_{x, m})$
- Decrypting $c = \text{prWE}' \cdot \text{Enc}(x, m)$ given witness w :
 - Set $c' = (c(i))_{i \in [|w|]}$
 - $m = c'(w)$



Issues with PRO

Counterexample to PRO

- Just seen: $\text{PRO} \Rightarrow \text{prWE}$
 - Hides prWE hides false statements!
- The notion of PRO is “self-defeating”
- Idea: aux is prWE for following statement:
 - x s.t. exists small circuit C st. $x = \text{TT}(c)$
 - i.e. x has small Kolmogorov complexity

Counterexample to PRO

Precondition

aux

$x = TT(PRF_K)$		prWE("x is TT of small C ", 0^λ)
	$\approx$	
u		prWE("u is TT of small C ", 0^λ)
	$\approx$	
u		prWE("u' is TT of small C ", 0^λ)
	$\approx$	
u		prWE("x is TT of small C ", 0^λ)

Counterexample to PRO

Postcondition

$$x = TT(PR F_K) = TT(PRO(PR F_K))$$

aux

$w =$

$PRO(PR F_K)$

$\text{prWE}(\text{"x is TT of small } C", 0^\lambda)$

$WE.Dec$

0^λ

Distinguisher!

u'


$\text{prWE}(\text{"x is TT of small } C", 0^\lambda)$

$WE.Dec$

$\perp$

A Weaker Notion

Indistinguishability PRO (iPRO)



- iO for Pseudorandom Functions
- Implied by iO $\Rightarrow$ no counterexamples!

$$\text{xiPRO: } |iPRO(C)| = |TT(C)|^{1-\epsilon}$$

From xiPRO to xiO

$$xiPRO(PRF_K(\cdot) + C(\cdot)) \quad \cancel{xiPRO(PRF_K(x))}$$

$$xiPRO((i,j) \mapsto e(g_1^{x_i}, g_2^{x_j}) \cdot g_T^{C(i,j)}) \quad e(g_1^{x_i}, g_2^{x_j}) \quad \cancel{via (g_1^{x_i})_i, (g_2^{x_j})_j}$$

via $QFE . Enc((x_i)_i, (y_j)_j)$
and $\{sk_{i,j}\}_{i,j}$

- Hide the $g_1^{x_i}, g_2^{x_j}$ using wrapper of quadratic FE
[Wee'20]
- Layer of amortisation of quadratic FE keys
- Does not go through local PRGs, LPN: “Coding Hardness”

$$\approx Sim(\{e(g_1^{x_i}, g_2^{x_j})\}_{i,j})$$


**PRO from private-coin evasive
LWE**

xPRO: PRO with polynomial compression

- Suffices to construct exponentially efficient version xPRO
- Bootstrapping similar to **[BV15,AJ15]**
- Additional ingredients: Blind Garbled Circuits **[BLSV18]** and blind LFE (new)

BDGM Approach to xiO

[BDGM20]




Dual-Regev Enc
(think hybrid encryption)

Leaks information about $FHE.sk$, C

BDGM Approach to xiO

[BDGM20]



Learning with Errors


[Regev05]

$$\boxed{S} \boxed{A} + \boxed{E} \approx \boxed{U} \quad \text{given} \quad \boxed{A}$$

gaussian

Noise Drowning/Flooding/Smudging

$$\boxed{E} + \boxed{Z} \approx_s \boxed{E}$$



Non-compact Magic Ciphertext

≡ xPRO Precondition

- Magic ciphertext is dual-Regev encryption of 0
- Idea: Magic ciphertext can be simulated given S and $TT(C)$
- E drowns noise artefacts
- Replace $Enc(C)$ with $Enc(0)$
- Pseudorandomness of $TT(C)$ makes (simulated) magic ciphertext pseudorandom
- **Establishes PRO precondition**

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{[Blue Bar]} \quad Enc(0) \\
 = \\
 \text{[Orange Bar]} \quad S' \quad \text{[Green Bar]} \quad P \quad + \quad \text{[Red Bar]} \quad E' \\
 \approx \\
 SP - Enc(TT(C)) + TT(C) + L(sk) + E \\
 \approx \\
 SP - Enc(TT(C)) + TT(C) + E \\
 \approx \\
 SP - Enc(TT(0)) + TT(C) + E \\
 \approx \\
 U
 \end{array}$$

Compressing the Magic Ciphertext

Pseudodrowning

- Magic ciphertext $SP + E$ is as large as truth table $TT(C)$
- Need to compress $SP + E$
- **Evasive LWE Recipe/Heuristic:** Actual scheme contains a term $SB + E$ and a short matrix $B^{-1}(P)$ with $B \cdot B^{-1}(P) = P$

Compressing the Magic Ciphertext

Rationale

$$\left(\begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline S & B \\ \hline \end{array} + \begin{array}{|c|} \hline E \\ \hline \end{array} \right) \begin{array}{|c|} \hline B^{-1}(P) \\ \hline \end{array}$$
$$= \begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline S & P \\ \hline \end{array} + \begin{array}{|c|} \hline E \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{|c|} \hline B^{-1}(P) \\ \hline \end{array}$$

In low rank subspace

Heuristic: behaves like

$$\begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline S & P \\ \hline \end{array} + \begin{array}{|c|} \hline E' \\ \hline \end{array}$$

full rank

Private Coin Evasive LWE

[Tsabary'22,Wee'22,VWW'22]

If

Precondition

$$\begin{array}{c} S \quad B \quad + \quad E \quad , \quad S \quad \boxed{P} \quad + \quad \boxed{E'} \\ \approx \\ \boxed{U} \quad , \quad \boxed{U'} \end{array} \quad \text{given} \quad \boxed{\text{aux}}$$

Then

Postcondition

$$\begin{array}{c} S \quad B \quad + \quad E \\ \approx \\ \boxed{U} \end{array} \quad \text{given} \quad \boxed{B^{-1}(P)} \quad \boxed{\text{aux}}$$

Compressing the Magic Ciphertext

Pseudodrowning


- **Evasive LWE Heuristic:** Only thing you can do with $B^{-1}(P)$ is expand samples and then ignore it
- Noise term in subspace behaves like a fresh gaussian noise term, use it to drown artefacts
- Evasive LWE is (essentially) always used for “pseudodrowning”

Direct Counterexamples to evasive LWE


- Evasive LWE counterexample from PRO is *contrived/pathologic*
- Direct/natural counterexample questioning the “pseudo-drowning” heuristic

Direct Counterexamples to evasive LWE

Precondition



Direct Counterexamples to evasive LWE



Takeaways

- PRO powerful tool to augment iO-like constructions with pseudorandomness properties
- In general too good to be true
- Notion of PRO suffers from counterexamples
- Concept of PRO shed light on issues with evasive LWE
- Fallback: iO for pseudorandom functions (iPRO), implies iO using standard pairing assumptions
- Looking ahead: Stronger Notions of PRO that do not suffer from counterexamples?



Thanks!