


# Efficient Cryptographic Proofs from RAA Codes

**Martijn  
Brehm**

University of  
Amsterdam




**Binyi  
Chen**

Stanford  
University

**Ben  
Fisch**

Yale  
University



**Nicolas  
Resch**

University of  
Amsterdam



**Ron D.  
Rothblum**

Succinct



**Hadas  
Zeilberger**

Yale  
University

# Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments (SNARGs)

[Kilian'92,  
Micali'94]

Prover:  $(x, w)$

Verifier:  $x$



proof  $\pi$



Key bottleneck  
in practice

Targets:

- *Succinct* proof:  $|\pi| \ll |w|$
- *Efficient* prover (linear time)
- *Efficient* verifier (polylog time)

Soundness  
against  
*poly-time*  
provers

$$L = \{x : \exists w, \Gamma(x, w) = 1\}$$

# Recall: Interactive Oracle Proofs (IOPs)


[Reingold-Rothblum-Rothblum'16, BenSasson-Chiesa-Spooner'16]

Hybrid between (public-coin) interactive proofs and PCPs

Prover:  $(x, w)$



Verifier:  $x$



# queries  
 $\ll |w|$

$x \stackrel{?}{\in} L$




$$L = \{x : \exists w, \Gamma(x, w) = 1\}$$


⋮

Soundness against  
*arbitrary* provers

# Common SNARG Construction Paradigm



# Common SNARG Construction Paradigm






# Polynomial IOPs

[RRR'16, BFS'20, CHMMVW'20]

Prover:  $(x, w)$




Verifier:  $x$




Queries:  
what is  $P_i(\alpha)$ ?

# Common SNARG Construction Paradigm




# Common SNARG Construction Paradigm





# Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS)

Key bottleneck in  
modern SNARGs



(short) commitment to  $P$

I'm convinced  
 $P(x) = y$

Later...



what is value of  $P$  on  $x$ ?

it is  $y$



# *Blaze: a new fast Multilinear PCS (MLPCS)*

- Focus on committing to **multilinear polynomials** over **characteristic 2** fields
- That is,  $P : \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}^r \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}$  is of the form

$$P(X_1, \dots, X_r) = \sum_{S \subseteq [r]} c_S \prod_{i \in S} X_i, \quad c_S \in \mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}$$

- Go hand-in-hand with highly efficient multilinear polynomial IOPs: Spartan [Set'20], Lasso/Jolt [STW'24, AST'24], Hyperplonk [CBBS'23] and generally GKR-based schemes such as Orion [XZS'22]

# Why Characteristic 2?

## Pros

- Addition is fast
- Eliminate "embedding overhead" [DP23]
- Friendly to arithmetization of logical operations

## Cons

- Multiplication is a bit more complicated (but we won't be doing much!)
- Less friendly to integer arithmetic

Real reason: we use a code that we currently only know how to analyze over  $\mathbb{F}_2$ ...

# Blaze Asymptotics

- Cost of committing to  $P : \mathbb{F}^r \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  (described by  $N = 2^r$  field elements)
- Commitment generation:  $8N$  additions + 1 Merkle Hash
- Evaluation proof generation:  $6N$  additions +  $5N$  multiplications
- Proof length and verification cost:  $O(N^2)$

**Prior works:**  
 $O(N \log N)$ , or  $O(N)$   
with unspecified  
constant

# Techniques: Bird's Eye View

1. Building on [code-switching technique \[RonZewi-Ron'20\]](#), using *code interleaving* we build an MLPCS from

MLPCS for "smaller"  
polynomials

Leads to proof-size &  
verification time

Error-correcting  
code

Leads to proving time  
& committing time

2. Use [Repeat-Accumulate-Accumulate \(RAA\)](#) codes, which have *very fast encoding* and (usually) *good distance*

# The Multi-Linear Polynomial Commitment Scheme (MLPCS)



# Multilinear Extension

Will identify  $u \in \mathbb{F}^k$  with a function  $u : \{0,1\}^{\log k} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$

- Given a function  $f : \{0,1\}^r \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$ , there exists a unique  $\hat{f} : \mathbb{F}^r \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  s.t.

$\hat{f}$  is multilinear

$\hat{f}(x) = f(x)$  for all  $x \in \{0,1\}^r$

- Specifically, take

$$\hat{f}(x) = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}^r} f(b) \cdot \text{eq}(b, x)$$

where  $\text{eq}(b, x) = \prod_{i=1}^r (b_i x_i + (1 - b_i)(1 - x_i))$

# MLPCS from Codes & IOPP

$(k = 2^r)$

Fix a code  $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$

To get a multilinear polynomial commitment scheme (MLPCS),  
suffices to design an interactive oracle proof of proximity  
(IOPP) for the language [FS'86, Kil'92, Mic'94, BCS'16]

$$\{\mathcal{C}(m) \in \mathbb{F}^n : m \in \mathbb{F}^k \text{ and } \hat{m}(z) = v\}$$

only need to reject if input is far (in  
Hamming distance) from language

# Interleaved Codes

$$t = \Theta(\log n)$$

Given  $\mathcal{C} : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$  and integer  $t$

Identify  $M \in \mathbb{F}^{t \times k}$ ,  $M \in \mathbb{F}^{tk}$   
and  $M : \{0,1\}^{\log t + \log k} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$

Construct new code  $\mathcal{C}^t : \mathbb{F}^{tk} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^{tn}$  by interleaving [Ligero, BCGGHJ'17]



Assuming IOPP for  $\{\mathcal{C}(m) \in \mathbb{F}^n : m \in \mathbb{F}^k \text{ and } \hat{m}(z) = v\}$  exists,

we construct IOPP for  $\{\mathcal{C}^t(M) : M \in \mathbb{F}^{t \times k}, \hat{M}(z) = v\}$  ( $z \in \mathbb{F}^{\log(tk)}$ )

$$M \in \mathbb{F}^{t \times k}, v \in \mathbb{F}$$

$$z \in \mathbb{F}^{\log(t)+\log(k)}$$

$C =$

$c_1$
$c_2$
$\vdots$
$c_t$

$$v \in \mathbb{F},$$

$$z \in \mathbb{F}^{\log(t)+\log(k)}$$



Need to prove

$$\hat{M}(z) = v$$

Idea: decompose to claim on *rows*



$$\hat{M}(z) = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}^{\log t + \log k}} \text{eq}(b, z) \cdot M(b)$$

$$= \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}^{\log t}, b_2 \in \{0,1\}^{\log k}} \text{eq}(b_1, z_1) \cdot \text{eq}(b_2, z_2) \cdot M(b_1, b_2)$$

$$= \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}^{\log t}} \text{eq}(b_1, z_1) \cdot \hat{M}_{b_1}(z_2)$$

$$z = (z_1, z_2) \in \mathbb{F}^{\log t} \times \mathbb{F}^{\log k}$$

# Multilinear Evaluation with Interleaving

1. **Prover sends** function  $u : \{0,1\}^{\log t} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$  defined as

$$u(x) = \hat{M}_x(z_2)$$

2. **Verifier checks** that

$$\hat{u}(z_1) = \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}^{\log t}} \text{eq}(b_1, z_1) \cdot u(b_1) = v$$

Send random  
linear combination  
of  $m_1, \dots, m_t$

If Verifier check passes but  $\hat{M}(z) \neq v$ ,  
then Prover sent incorrect  $u$

How to  
enforce  
correctness?

$M \in \mathbb{F}^{t \times k}, v \in \mathbb{F}$   
 $z \in \mathbb{F}^{\log(t)+\log(k)}$

$C =$

$c_1$
$c_2$
$\vdots$
$c_t$

$v \in \mathbb{F},$   
 $z \in \mathbb{F}^{\log(t)+\log(k)}$



Compute  $u(x) = \hat{M}_x(z_2)$




Check  $\hat{u}(z_1) \stackrel{?}{=} v$

Sample  $r \in \mathbb{F}^t$

$c_0 := \sum_i r_i c_i,$   
 which is

$\mathcal{C}$ -encoding of  
 $m_0 := \sum_i r_i m_i$



Run IOPP for  $\mathcal{C}$   
 with  $m_0, c_0, z_2,$   
 $v_0 := \sum_i r_i u_i$

Check  
 consistency of  $c_0$   
 and  $C$  for  $\Omega(\lambda/\delta)$   
 $i \in [n]$



# Proximity Gaps

What if  $C \in \mathbb{F}^{t \times n}$  is far from  $\mathcal{C}^t$ ?

Can use elegant results on *proximity gaps* for codes [RVW'13, BKS'18] to guarantee that whp,  $c_0 = \sum_i r_i c_i$  is far from  $\mathcal{C}$

Theorem: ([BKS'18]) Suppose  $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$  has min. distance  $\delta$ , let  $U \subseteq \mathbb{F}^n$  be an affine space and suppose  $\exists u \in U$  for which  $\Delta(u, \mathcal{C}) > \tau$ . Then if  $\varepsilon > 0$  is s.t.  $\tau - \varepsilon < \delta/3$ ,

$$\mathbb{P}_{u \in U}[\Delta(u, \mathcal{C}) < \tau - \varepsilon] \leq (\varepsilon \mathbb{F})^{-1}$$

# Summary

Prover time dominated by computation of  $t$   $\mathcal{C}$ -encodings

So: pick code with *blazing fast* encoding!

Additionally: for soundness need good distance

Actually,  $\mathcal{C}$  better already have an IOPP for multilinear evaluation...

can use "off-the-shelf" constructions

but we actually provide tailor-made one for our choice of  $\mathcal{C}$

# Repeat-Accumulate-Accumulate Codes [Divsalar-Jin-McEliece'98]

# RAA Encoding

(rate 1/4 case)

working over  $\mathbb{F}_2 \dots$

Repeat

$m \in \mathbb{F}_2^k$

Permute


Accumulate

prefix-sum mod 2

Permute


Accumulate

prefix-sum mod 2



# RAA Generator Matrix

(rate 1/4 case)



# Analysis

Over **random choice** of 2 permutations, we show whp  
a rate 1/4 RAA code has **min. distance**  $\geq 0.19$

GV bound for  
rate 1/4:  
 $\sim 0.21$

This builds off prior works [PS'03, BMS'07, KZKC'07, RF'09]

Use *Input-Output-Weight-Enumerator Function*

$$N(a, b) := |\{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n : \text{wt}(x) = a \text{ and } \text{wt}(xA) = b\}|$$

$$= \binom{b-1}{\lceil a/2 \rceil - 1} \cdot \binom{n-b}{\lfloor a/2 \rfloor}$$

$$p_{a \rightarrow b} := \mathbb{P}_{\substack{x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n, \\ \text{wt}(x) = a}} [\text{wt}(xA) = b] = \frac{N(a, b)}{\binom{n}{a}}$$



# Analysis

Let  $X$  = number of codewords of weight  $\leq d$

By Markov:  $\mathbb{P}[\text{dist}(\mathcal{C}) \leq d] = \mathbb{P}[X \geq 1] \leq \mathbb{E}[X]$

number of  
messages

prob. of going from  
*repeated* message weight  
to intermediate weight

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_{a=1}^{n/4} \sum_{b=1}^n \sum_{w=1}^d \binom{n/4}{a} \cdot p_{4a \rightarrow b} \cdot p_{b \rightarrow w}$$

choices for  
message weight

choices for  
intermediate  
weight

choices for  
codeword  
weight

prob. of going from  
intermediate weight to  
codeword weight

# Analysis

$$\mathbb{E}[X] = \sum_{a=1}^{n/4} \sum_{b=1}^n \sum_{w=1}^d \binom{n/4}{a} \cdot p_{4a \rightarrow b} \cdot p_{b \rightarrow w}$$

Break up sum based on  $b$

$b \leq h = \omega(\log n)$ :  
use  $\binom{a}{b} \leq \left(\frac{ea}{b}\right)^b$ ;  
final bound  $1/n^\varepsilon$

$b \geq h = \omega(\log n)$ :  
use  $\binom{a}{b} \leq 2^{aH(b/a)}$ ;  
final bound  $2^{-\Omega(h)}$

# Tests

From crypto perspective: failure probability  $1/n^\epsilon$  quite large...

also,  $1/n^{O(1)}$  unavoidable (consider prob. of weight  $O(1) \rightarrow O(1) \rightarrow O(1)$ ; all terms  $1/\text{poly}(n)$ )

Actually, just check first round accumulation

To boost failure probability: check encoding of low-weight messages

Conditioned on test passing, failure probability decreases substantially

but with poly-time test, failure probability still  $\geq 1/\text{poly}(n)$ ...


# RAA over Extension Fields

Thus far: analyzed RAA codes over  $\mathbb{F}_2$

But: for soundness, need  $|\mathbb{F}| = 2^\lambda, \lambda \approx 128$


Can use same generator matrix  $G$  to define code over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^\lambda}$

Can implement by "bit-slicing"



# Conclusion


# Recap



1. Building on **code-switching technique** [RonZewi-Ron'20], using **code interleaving** we build an MLPCS from

"Smaller"  
MLPCS

Leads to proof-size &  
verification time



IOPP for

$$\{\mathcal{C}(m) \in \mathbb{F}^n : m \in \mathbb{F}^k \text{ and } \hat{m}(z) = v\}$$

Error-correcting  
code

Leads to proving time  
& committing time

2. Use **Repeat-Accumulate-Accumulate (RAA)** codes, which have **very fast encoding** and are (usually) **near GV-bound**



# Open Problems

- Analyze RA\* codes directly over larger alphabets?  
[BFKTWZ'24] Can we approach the Singleton bound?
- (More) explicit constructions? Like [Applebaum-Kachlon'20], design test that leads to negligible  $n^{-\omega(1)}$  failure probability?
- Could puncturing be useful?
- Concrete bounds for smaller  $n$ ? (currently need  $n \approx 2^{20}$ )
- Improved proximity gaps? Maybe tailor-made for RAA codes?

Thank you!