Attacks on RLWE

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Homomorphic Encryption

Practical Homomorphic Encryption schemes based on lattices, proposed in 2011 by Brakerski, Gentry, Vaikuntanathan in [BV], [BGV]. (also [GHS], [GSW], [SS], [BLLN], ...)

Applications to cloud storage and services:

* private cloud-based electronic medical records systems
* private predictive analysis
* machine learning on encrypted data
* genomic computation on encrypted data
Some History: Lattice-based Crypto

* Ajtai-Dwork public-key cryptosystem: based on the worst-case hardness of a variant of Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) [AD97]

* NTRU family of cryptosystems: defined in particularly efficient lattices connected to number fields [HPS98]

* NTRU standardized in IEEE P1363.1 Lattice-Based Public Key Cryptography standard [2008]
New Hardness Assumptions

* New assumption introduced, Learning-With-Errors (LWE) [Regev]

* Ring-Learning-With-Errors (RLWE) proposed
  [Lyubashevsky-Peikert-Regev]

* LWE/RLWE related via security reductions to hard lattice
  problems: (Gap-)SVP and Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD)
  [Regev, Lyubashevsky-Peikert-Regev, ...]
Ring-LWE distribution

\[ K = \text{number field}, \ R = \mathcal{O}_K, \]
\[ R^\vee = \{ y \in R | \text{Tr}(xy) \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ for all } x \in R \}. \]
\[ K_R = K \otimes \mathbb{R} \text{ and } \mathbb{T} = K_R/R^\vee. \]

For \( q \in \mathbb{Z} \), let \( R_q := R/qR \).

**Definition (Ring-LWE Distribution)**

For \( s \in R_q^\vee \) a secret, and an error distribution \( \psi \) over \( K_R \), the Ring-LWE distribution \( A_{s,\psi} \) over \( R_q \times \mathbb{T} \) consists of samples

\[ (a, (a \cdot s)/q + e \mod R^\vee) \]

\( a \in R_q \) chosen uniformly at random, \( e \) chosen from the error distribution \( \psi \).
Ring-LWE hardness assumptions

**Definition (Ring-LWE Search Problem)**

Let $\Psi$ be a family of distributions over $K_\mathbb{R}$. The Ring-LWE Search problem ($RLWE_{q,\psi}$), for some $s \in R_q^\vee$ and $\psi \in \Psi$, is to find $s$, given arbitrarily many independent samples from $A_{s,\psi}$.

**Definition (Ring-LWE Average-Case Decision Problem)**

Let $\Upsilon$ be a family of error distributions over $K_\mathbb{R}$. The Ring-LWE Average-Case Decision problem ($RDLWE_{q,\Upsilon}$) is to distinguish with non-negligible advantage between arbitrarily many independent samples from $A_{s,\psi}$, for a random choice of $s \in R_q^\vee$ and $\psi \in \Upsilon$, and the same number of samples chosen independently and uniformly at random from $R_q \times \mathbb{T}$. 
Worst-case hardness of search version of ring-LWE

$K = \text{cyclotomic number field of degree } n$, $R = \mathcal{O}_K$, $q = \text{prime}$

$\Psi_\alpha = \text{elliptical Gaussian of parameter } \alpha$.

**Theorem (Lyubashevsky, Peikert, Regev in LPR10)**

Let $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ be such that $\alpha \cdot q \geq \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$, then there is a probabilistic polynomial-time quantum reduction from the $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n}/\alpha)$-approximate SIVP problem on ideal lattices in $K$ to $\text{RLWE}_{q,\Psi_\zeta_q}$ given $l$ samples where $\zeta = \alpha(ln \log(ln))^{1/4}$.

The PLWE problem

The PLWE problem was first defined in [LPR10] by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, Regev and in [BV11] by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan.

For all $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$, let $f(x) = f_\kappa(x)$ be a polynomial of degree $n = n(\kappa)$, and let $q = q(\kappa)$ be a prime integer. Let $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(f)$, let $R_q = R/qR$ and let $\chi$ denote a distribution over $R$.

**Definition (The PLWE assumption)**

The PLWE assumption $\text{PLWE}_{f,q,\chi}$ states that for any $\ell = \text{poly}(\kappa)$ it holds that

$$\{a_i, a_i \cdot s + e_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$$

is computationally *indistinguishable* from $\{a_i, u_i\}_{i \in [\ell]}$, where $s$ is sampled from the noise distribution $\chi$ over $R_q$, the $a_i$ are uniform in $R_q$, the $e_i$ are sampled from $\chi$ and the ring elements $u_i$ are uniformly random over $R_q$. 
Let \( K = \mathbb{Q}[x]/(f(x)) \) be a number field such that \( f(1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q} \), and such that \( q \) can be chosen large enough.

Let \( R := \mathcal{O}_K \), and let \( R_q := R/qR \).

Given samples, \((a_i, b_i) \in R_q \times R_q\), we have to decide whether the samples are uniform or come from a PLWE distribution.

To do this we take the representatives of \( a_i \) and \( b_i \) in \( R \), call them \( a_i \) and \( b_i \) again, and evaluate them at 1.
The attack

This gives us elements $a_i(1), b_i(1) \in \mathbb{F}_q$.

If $(a_i, b_i)$ are PLWE samples, then by definition,

$$b_i = a_i \cdot s + e_i,$$

and so

$$b_i(1) \equiv (a_i \cdot s)(1) + e_i(1) \pmod{q}.$$  

Since $f(1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$, the Chinese Remainder Theorem gives us that

$$b_i(1) \equiv a_i(1) \cdot s(1) + e_i(1) \pmod{q}.$$
The attack

Now we can guess $s(1)$, and we have $q$ choices.

For each of our guesses we compute $b_i(1) - a_i(1) \cdot s(1)$.  

** If $(a_i, b_i)$ are PLWE samples and our guess for $s(1)$ is correct, then $b_i(1) - a_i(1) \cdot s(1) = e_i(1)$, and we will detect that it is non-uniform, because $e_i$ is taken from $\chi$.

(For example, if $e_i$ is taken from a Gaussian with small radius, then $e_i(1)$ will be “small” for all $i$ and hence not uniform.)

** If $(a_i, b_i)$ are uniform samples, then $b_i(1) - a_i(1) \cdot s(1)$ for any fixed choice of $s(1)$ will still be uniform, since $a_i(1), b_i(1)$ are both uniform modulo $q$.  

Overview of Eisentraeger-Hallgren-Lauter

\[ K = \mathbb{Q}(\beta) = \mathbb{Q}[x]/(f(x)), \ n = \text{degree of } K, \ R = \mathcal{O}_K, \ q \text{ prime} \]

Consider the following properties:

1. \((q)\) splits completely in \(K\), and \(q \nmid [R : \mathbb{Z}[\beta]]\);
2. \(K\) is Galois over \(\mathbb{Q}\);
3. the ring of integers of \(K\) is generated over \(\mathbb{Z}\) by \(\beta\),
   \(\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[\beta] = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(f(x))\) with \(f'(\beta) \mod q\) “small”;
4. the transformation between the Minkowski embedding of \(K\)
   and the power basis representation of \(K\) is given by a scaled
   orthogonal matrix;
5. \(f(1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q}\);
6. \(q\) can be chosen suitably large.
*For \((K, q)\) satisfying conditions (1) and (2), we have a search-to-decision reduction from \(RLWE_q\) to \(RDLWE_q\).

*For \((K, q)\) satisfying conditions (3) and (4), we have a reduction from \(RDLWE_q\) to \(PLWE_q\).

* For \((K, q)\) satisfying conditions (5) and (6), we have an attack which breaks instances of the PLWE decision problem.
For number fields $K$ satisfying all 6 properties, we would have an attack on the RLWE problem!

However, this does not happen in general and we don’t have any examples of number fields satisfying *all 6 properties*.

For example, 2-power cyclotomic fields, which are used in practice, don’t satisfy property (5).
*The proof of the search-to-decision reduction from $RLWE_q$ to $RDLWE_q$ is a slight generalization of the proof given byLyubashevsky, Peikert, Regev in [LPR] for the case of cyclotomicfields.

*The proof of the reduction from $RDLWE_q$ to $PLWE$ is a slightlymore general restatement of the proof given by Ducas and Durmusin [DD] for the 2-power cyclotomic case.

We will not give details in this talk.
... to a more general class of number fields:

Suppose that $f(x)$ has a root $\beta$ modulo $q$ which has small order in $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^*$. If $f(\beta) \equiv 0 \mod q$, then the same attack above will work by evaluating samples at $\beta$, instead of at 1.

Now unfortunately, the value of the error polynomials $e_i(\beta)$ are harder to distinguish from random ones than in the case $\beta = 1$: although the $e_i(x)$ have small coefficients modulo $q$, the powers of $\beta$ may grow large and also may wrap around modulo $q$. 
However, if $\beta$ has small order in $(\mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z})^*$, then the set $
abla \{\beta^i\}_{i=0,\ldots,n-1}$ takes on only a small number values, and this can be used to distinguish samples arising from $e_i(\beta)$ from random ones with non-negligible advantage.
Moving the attack to RLWE

Key point: hardness of RLWE is established when embedding $R$ into $\mathbb{R}^n$ via the canonical, i.e. Minkowski embedding

PLWE uses a polynomial basis for the ring $R$.

Errors are generated coordinate-wise in the polynomial basis.

In order to attack an RLWE instance, the error must not get too distorted when passing to the polynomial basis.

This distortion we will call the *spectral distortion* for $R = \mathbb{Z}[\beta]$. 
Weak RLWE

A Ring-LWE instance is weak if the following three properties hold:

1. $K$ is monogenic.
2. $f$ satisfies $f(1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$.
3. $\rho$ and $\sigma$ are sufficiently small

where $\sigma$ is the width of the error distribution and $\rho$ is the spectral distortion.
Main Theorem

Theorem

Let $K$ be a number field such that $K = \mathbb{Q}(\beta)$, $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[\beta]$. Let $f$ be the minimal polynomial of $\beta$, $q$ a prime such that $f(1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$ and suppose that the spectral norm $\rho$ satisfies

$$\rho < \frac{q}{4\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma n}.$$ 

Then the non-dual Ring-LWE decision problem for $K, q, \sigma$ can be solved in time $\tilde{O}(\ell q)$ with probability $1 - 2^{-\ell}$, using a dataset of $\ell$ samples.
Consider the family of polynomials

\[ f_{n,q}(x) = x^n + q - 1 \]

for \( q \) a prime. These satisfy \( f(1) \equiv 0 \pmod{q} \).

By the Eisenstein criterion, they are irreducible whenever \( q - 1 \) has a prime factor that appears to exponent 1.
Theorem

Suppose $q$ is prime, $n$ is an integer and $f = f_{n,q}$ satisfies

1. $n$ is a power of the prime $\ell$,
2. $q - 1$ is squarefree,
3. $\ell^2 \nmid ((1 - q)^n - (1 - q))$,
4. we have $\tau > 1$, where

$$\tau := \frac{q}{4\sqrt{\pi \sigma'} n(q - 1)^{\frac{1}{2}} - \frac{1}{2^n}}.$$ 

Then the non-dual Ring-LWE decision problem can be solved in time $\tilde{O}(\ell q)$ with probability $1 - 2^{-\ell}$, using a dataset of $\ell$ samples.
CRYPTO 2015 paper contains:

Examples of weak PLWE fields and weak RLWE fields

Weak PLWE cyclotomic fields with alternate polynomial basis

Code for attacks

Heuristics on spectral norms for general number fields

Questions in Number Theory
Suggested parameter choices secure against the *distinguishing attack* by Micciancio and Regev [MR09] and the *decoding attack* by Lindner and Peikert [LP]

Concrete security estimates [LP] against these attacks lead to suggested parameters, at the “high security” level, of $n = 320$, $q \approx 2^{12}$, and $\sigma = 8$.

For those parameter choices, the distinguishing attack is estimated to run in time $2^{122}$ (seconds) to obtain a distinguishing advantage of $2^{-64}$. 

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**Parameter choices**

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The decoding attack in Lindner and Peikert [LP] recovers the secret. It requires a reduced basis, and the estimated time to compute the reduced basis when $n = 320$ and $q \approx 2^{12}$ is $2^{119}$ seconds for decoding probability $2^{-64}$.

Our attack on PLWE for weak number fields runs in time $\tilde{O}(q)$, so these parameters would not be safe against this attack.

Typically, Leveled and Practical Homomorphic Encryption schemes use much larger $q$, at least $2^{128}$, and those parameters would be fine. ([GHS], [LNV], [GLN], [BLN])
Successfully coded attacks

Ring-LWE and Poly-LWE parameters attacked on a Thinkpad X220 laptop with Sage Mathematics Software

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>case</th>
<th>$f$</th>
<th>$q$</th>
<th>$s$</th>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>samples per run</th>
<th>time per run</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poly-LWE</td>
<td>$x^{1024} + 2^{31} - 2$</td>
<td>$2^{31} - 1$</td>
<td>3.192</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13.5 hrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ring-LWE</td>
<td>$x^{128} + 524288x + 524285$</td>
<td>524287</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ring-LWE</td>
<td>$x^{192} + 4092$</td>
<td>4093</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>0.0136</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ring-LWE</td>
<td>$x^{256} + 8189$</td>
<td>8190</td>
<td>8.35</td>
<td>0.0152</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44 sec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questions in Number theory

What are possible spectral distortions of algebraic numbers?

Are there fields of cryptographic size which are Galois and monogenic? (other than the cyclotomic number fields and their maximal real subfields?)

What is the distribution of elements of small order among residues modulo $q$?

What is the smallest residue modulo a prime $q$ which has order exactly $r$?